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Tributes
Cornerstones of Civil Justice
NEIL ANDREWS†
INTRODUCTION
Geoff Hazard was a jurist of great vision and huge intellectual ability. He
was also versatile. Many were lucky to have witnessed his mastery of the law in
class, or American Law Institute (ALI) meetings, or in the wider forum of soft
law preparation, especially the sessions in Rome from 2000 to 2004, which led
to the ALI/UNIDROIT’s Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure.1 During
the Rome discussions, it was clear that he had a remarkable capacity to
summarize complex argument, to identity opportunities for progress, and to
accept that on other points legal systems approach things quite differently. In
this respect, he was also a great comparative lawyer.
Here, the Author will consider briefly the underpinning principles of civil
procedure. A stimulating collection of major procedural principles is the
ALI/UNIDROIT’s Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure.2 In Europe,
signatory states, including the United Kingdom, must comply with the
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court concerning the guarantees contained in
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Besides these
external influences, there is the internal task of arranging a set of fundamental
procedural norms. Such a canon of principles seems indispensable if lawyers are
to view procedural justice in a coherent and systematic way, liberated from the
fine detail of individual rules. The Author suggests that principles of civil justice
can be usefully arranged under these four headings:
I. Access to Justice
II. Fairness of the Process
III. Speed and Efficiency
IV. Just Conclusions

† University of Cambridge, Professor of Civil Justice and Private Law.
1. AM. LAW INST., UNIDROIT, Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, https://www.unidroit.org/
instruments/transnational-civil-procedure (last updated Sept. 27, 2016) [hereinafter ALI/UNIDROIT]; see also
infra Part I.
2. See id.

[1045]
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In greater detail, this is how the various leading and fundamental principles
of civil justice can be arranged:
I. ACCESS TO JUSTICE
1. Access to court and to justice (including, where appropriate, promoting
settlement and facilitating resort to alternative forms of dispute-resolution,
notably mediation and arbitration)
2. Rights of Legal Representation (Right to Choose a Lawyer; Confidential
Legal Consultation; Representation in Legal Proceedings)
3. Protection against bad or spurious claims and defenses
II. FAIRNESS OF THE PROCESS
4. Judicial independence
5. Judicial impartiality
6. Publicity or open justice
7. Procedural Equality (equal respect for the parties)
8. Fair play between the parties
9. Judicial duty to avoid surprise: The Principle of Due Notice
10. Equal access to information, including disclosure of information
between parties
III. SPEED AND EFFICIENCY
11. Judicial control of the civil process to ensure focus and proportionality
(tempered, where appropriate, by Procedural Equity; the process is not to
be administered in an oppressive manner)
12. Avoidance of Undue Delay
IV. JUST CONCLUSIONS
13. Judicial duty to give reasons
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14. Accuracy of decision-making
15. Effectiveness (provision of protective relief and enforcement of
judgments)
16. Finality
I. ALI/UNIDROIT PROJECT (2000–2006)
The working group of the ALI/UNIDROIT project3—now known as
Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure4—first met in Rome in 2000. On
day one, a detailed document containing Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure,
drafted by Geoff Hazard and Michele Taruffo, was on the meeting table. By the
second day of this first meeting, the working group had drawn up a list of
principles. These were elaborated during the working group’s meetings from
2000 to 2003. Rolf Stürner, appointed to be the General Reporter of the
UNIDROIT side of this collaborative project, has chronicled the working
group’s elaboration of these principles.5 The original Rules were not rejected but
they became the subsidiary element of the project. They were later refined, once
the principles had been established—and fixing the principles took three years
of debate. The Rules are more detailed than the Principles. As Geoffrey Hazard
explained, the Rules are merely one, among many, possible ways of
implementing the Principles.6 In fact, the Rules were relegated to an unofficial
appendix to the main project.
The ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure offer a
balanced distillation of best practice, especially in the sphere of transnational
commercial litigation. They are not restricted to the largely uncontroversial
‘high terrain’ of constitutional guarantees of due process. The Principles and
Rules were drafted by a team, appointed by the ALI and UNIDROIT. The
drafting team met for a total of twenty days in Rome during the years 2000–
2003 (the Author was privileged to be a member). The “Common Law” was
clearly out-numbered seven to two by the “Civil Law” representatives. It is also
fair to say that the civil-law members of the group were strong in resisting certain
common-law ideas. Everywhere the restraining hand of the Civil Law is visible,
and robust common-law tendencies (American and English) are curbed.
It was apparent throughout the drafting group’s discussion that there were
radical differences between the U.S. and English systems, and between the

3. Neil Andrews, The Modern Procedural Synthesis: The American Law Institute and UNIDROIT’s
“Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure,” 164 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 109, 109–20 (2008)
(Braz.).
4. ALI/UNIDROIT (2016), supra note 2.
5. See generally Rolf Stürner, The Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure: An Introduction to Their
Basic Conceptions, 69 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 201 (2005) (Ger.).
6. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michele Taruffo, Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure Rules and
Commentary, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 495–508 (1997) (listing rules).

70.4 - ANDREWS (DO NOT DELETE)

1048

5/10/2019 11:39 AM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:1045

various civil law jurisdictions represented around the table. These differences
make a nonsense of both the glib phrase “Anglo-American procedure” and the
crude expression “civilian procedure.”
Sometimes, the Principles acknowledge that there is scope for radical
differences of approach on aspects of practice.7 Such agnosticism pervades
discussion of the following topics: sanctions for procedural default, receipt of
expert evidence, examination of witnesses, and the system of appeal.
As the Author has suggested elsewhere, the Principles operate at three
levels of importance: “fundamental procedural guarantees,” other “leading
principles,” and “framework or incidental principles.”8 The ALI/UNIDROIT
principles range from (1) quasi-constitutional declarations of fundamental
procedural guarantees to (2) major guidelines concerning the style and course of
procedure to (3) points of important detail.9
I. FUNDAMENTAL PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
1. Judicial Competence; Judicial Independence; Judicial Impartiality;
Procedural Equality;
2. Due Notice or the Right to Be Heard; Publicity; Reasoned Decisions;
3. Prompt and Accelerated Justice;
4. Professional Independence of Counsel; Right to Assistance of
Counsel; Attorney-Client Privilege (“Legal Professional Privilege”);
5. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.10
II. LEADING PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE STYLE AND COURSE OF
PROCEDURE
1. Jurisdiction over Parties; Venue Rules; Party Initiation of Proceedings;
2. Party’s definition of scope of proceedings; Joinder Rules; Allocation of
burden and nature of standard of proof; Pleadings; Parties’ duty to avoid
false pleading and abuse of process;
7. ALI/UNIDROIT (2016), supra note 2, at 12.5, P-12B (“There are differences in the rules of various
countries governing jurisdictions over third parties. In some civil-law systems, a valid third-party claim is itself
a basis of jurisdiction whereas in some common-law systems the third party must be independently subject to
jurisdiction.”).
8. Neil Andrews, Embracing the Noble Quest for Transnational Procedural Principles, in THE FUTURE
OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: ENGLISH RESPONSES TO THE ALI/UNIDROIT DRAFT PRINCIPLES AND
RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 21, 22 (Mads Andenas, Neil Andrews et al. eds., 2004) (emphasis
added).
9. Id. at 23–25.
10. Id. at 23; see also European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950 (amended 1998).
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3. Rights of Access to Information; Judicial Initiative in Evidential
Matters; Experts
4. Judicial Management of Proceedings; Sanctions Against Default and
Non-compliance; Need for Proportionality in Use of Sanctions;
5. Parties’ duty to act fairly and to promote efficient and speedy
proceedings; Parties’ duty to co-operate;
6. Parties’ right to discontinue or settle proceedings; Judicial
Encouragement of Settlement,
7. Right to an Oral Stage of Procedure; Final Hearing Before Ultimate
Adjudicators; Judicial Responsibility for Correct Application of the Law;
8. Basic Costs Shifting Rule; Finality of Decisions; Appeal Mechanisms;
9. Effective Enforcement; Recognition by Foreign Courts; International
Judicial Co-operation.11
III. POINTS OF IMPORTANT DETAIL
1. Protection of Parties Lacking Capacity;
2. Security for Costs;
3. Expedited Forms of Communication;
4. Non-party Submissions;
5. Making of Judicial “Suggestions.”12
The ALI/UNIDROIT project was not the first attempt at bridging the
division between civilian and common-law procedures. Marcel Storme (and his
team, including Tony Jolowicz) led the way.13 Although the ALI/UNIDROIT
project is relatively young (completed in 2004, published in 2006), it seems
likely that it will assist greatly in the intellectual mapping of civil justice and
that it will influence policy-makers. At a 2002 London meeting, the

11. Andrews, supra note 8, at 23–24.
12. Id. at 24.
13. APPROXIMATION OF JUDICIARY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Marcel Storme ed., 1994).
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ALI/UNIDROIT text was widely admired by English commentators, who found
this work to be suggestive, original, and admirably flexible.14
Since 2013, the European Law Institute and UNIDROIT have been
engaged in a topic-by-topic project, which is intended to transpose the
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and elaborate more concrete soft-law rules within
the European jurisdictions (not confined to the European Union).
II. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The Human Rights Act 1998 (United Kingdom)—which took effect in
October 2000—rendered the European Convention on Human Rights directly
applicable in English courts. The case law of the European Court of Human
Rights must be “taken into account” and becomes binding in the United
Kingdom only in restricted circumstances, according to the United Kingdom
Supreme Court.15 Lord Neuberger explained the position as follows:
This Court is not bound to follow every decision of the [European
court]. . . . Where, however, there is a clear and constant line of decisions whose
effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect
of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to overlook or misunderstand
some argument or point of principle, we consider that it would be wrong for this
Court not to follow that line.16

Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights states: “Right to
a Fair Trial: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”17
The preceding encapsulation of fundamental principles comprises the
following elements:
1. The right to “a fair hearing”: this is a wide concept embracing:
a. The right to be present at an adversarial hearing;
b. The right to equality of arms;
c. The right to fair presentation of the evidence;
d. The right to cross examine opponents’ witnesses;
2. The right to a reasoned judgment;18
3. “A public hearing”: including the right to a public pronouncement of
judgment;
14. Adrian Zuckerman, Note, Conference on “The ALI-UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational
Civil Procedure,” 21 CIV. JUST. Q. 322 (2002).
15. Times Newspapers Ltd. v. Flood [2017] UKSC 33, [29]–[41] (appeal taken from Eng.); Poshteh v.
Royal Borough of Kensington [2017] UKSC 36, [29]–[37] (appeal taken from Eng.); Manchester CC v. Pinnock
[2010] UKSC 45, [48] (appeal taken from Eng.).
16. Manchester CC, [2010] UKSC at [48].
17. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 6(1); Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 c42,
§ 1(3), Schedule 1 (incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into U.K. law).
18. See English v. Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 605 (noting that Article 6(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights requires a court to provide a reasoned judgment within a reasonable
time).
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4. “A hearing within a reasonable time”; and
5. “A hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.”19
A. ABOLITION OF THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS:
CREATION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
Undoubtedly, the most significant impact of the European Convention on
Human Rights was the decision to abolish the traditional judicial role of the Lord
Chancellor and reconstitute the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords as
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which first sat on October 1, 2009.
These events unfolded as follows. The European Court of Human Rights
in McGonnell v. United Kingdom,20 a case concerning legal arrangements on the
island of Guernsey—a “mini-legal system” within the British Isles—had
signaled the need for there to be complete separation of judicial, executive, and
legislative functions. The court (sitting in Strasbourg) held that the United
Kingdom infringed this requirement because the Bailiff of Guernsey (a judge
and a member of the Guernsey legislature) had sat in a civil case concerning
planning legislation, which was enacted when he was presiding over the
legislative chamber on the island.21 The Strasbourg Court in McGonnell held
that such a confusion of legislative and judicial roles is “[in]compatible with the
requirements of Article 6 as to independence and impartiality” demanded by
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.22 The court said that
once a person presided over a legislative chamber, he should be precluded from
adjudicating in any civil or criminal case that requires interpretation of the
relevant enactment.23 Building on the McGonnell case, constitutional purists24
contended that it would be desirable, even—as they further argued—necessary, to
detach the judicial House of Lords from the legislative House of Lords so that
(1) the Law Lords would be physically separate from the legislature and (2) they
would no longer be allowed to participate in legislative debates.25
In 2005, the Constitutional Reform Act26 was enacted, leading to the
House’s abolition in 2009. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 stripped out the
judicial role from the ancient office of the Lord Chancellor. He has ceased to be
a judge. Instead, he is merely a representative of the Executive, a Minister of the

19. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 6(1).
20. 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 289 (2000).
21. Id. at [15]–[16].
22. Id. at [52].
23. Id. at [57].
24. See, e.g., Lord Steyn, The Case for a Supreme Court, 118 L.Q.R. 382, 383 (2002) (Eng.) (criticizing
the multi-faceted role of the Lord Chancellor).
25. Id. at 388.
26. “Reform! Reform! Don’t talk to me about reform. Aren’t things bad enough already?” Lord Neuberger,
Pres. of the Supreme Court of the U.K., Address: “The Supreme Court: Is the House of Lords ‘Losing Part of
Itself’” (Dec. 2, 2009 at [13]) (transcript available in the National Archives of the United Kingdom).
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Crown, and a Cabinet member. Furthermore, since the 2005 Act, the Lord
Chancellor need not be legally qualified. Once the Lord Chancellor was downgraded to a non-judicial Minister, the ground was cleared for creating a Supreme
Court. On October 1, 2009, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom sat for
the first time.
The constitutional purists prevailed. Whether or not there was any
constitutional necessity to disturb the settled traditions of the House of Lords,
the new court is now manifestly insulated from any “legislative or executive
contamination”: none of its judges is involved in the legislative process or in the
practice of Government. But it is still a matter for political debate whether it was
necessary to create the Supreme Court and annihilate the judicial House of
Lords.
B. “ACCESS TO COURT” PRINCIPLE
The European Court of Human Rights in Golder v. United Kingdom27
divined an implicit fundamental right of ‘access to court’. Lord Bingham in
Brown v. Stott explained:
Article 6 contains no express right of access to a court, but in Golder v. United
Kingdom the European Court held . . . that it was “inconceivable” that article 6
should describe the procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending law
suit and should not first protect that which alone makes it possible to benefit from
such guarantees, namely access to a court.28

Thus, the court in the Golder case conceded that this implied right was not
absolute and so was subject to limitations.29
The right of access to court is not engaged unless there is a procedural
restriction or impediment. It follows that a substantive rule, which renders the
defendant’s conduct lawful, even though it might be unlawful in the absence of
that substantive rule, is not open to challenge by reference to the present human
right.30
The Supreme Court in R (on the application of UNISON) v. Lord
Chancellor31 considered the legality of the Government’s scheme imposing
significant commencement fees, payable by persons seeking redress within an
Employment Tribunal (for example, claims for unfair dismissal or
discrimination). The Supreme Court held that it was a breach of European Union
law and contrary to the U.K.’s constitutional principle of access to justice.32 Lord

27. App. No. 4451/70 Eur. Co. H.R. para. 35, HUDOC (Feb. 21, 1975), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-57496.
28. [2003] 1 AC 681, 694.
29. Golder, App. No. 4451/70 Eur. Co. H.R. para. 29.
30. Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 1, [42]–[45] (appeal taken from U.K.).
31. [2017] UKSC 51 (appeal taken from U.K.).
32. Id.
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Reed’s judgment33 is a powerful vindication of this principle. The court drew
upon detailed studies of the impact of these fees.34
The Court of Appeal in Re K, H (Children) critically commented on the
absence of public civil aid funding to enable cross-examination to be conducted
by a lawyer, rather than being left to the court itself. The same court noted that
it was inappropriate for the relevant party, a father, to conduct the crossexamination personally because that would involve oppressive confrontation
between him and his daughter (the complainant) whom he had allegedly sexually
assaulted.35
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION BANS ON ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS
This judicial prohibition (for the European Court of Justice’s decisions in
the three seminal cases) has hit hard within England and Wales. Many commonlaw lawyers regret the ban.
A. JURISDICTION CLAUSES WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION OR FOR LUGANO
CONVENTION JURISDICTIONS
The European Court of Justice’s decision in Turner v. Grovit36 prevents the
English courts from issuing anti-suit injunctions to enforce exclusive English
jurisdiction clauses where the offending court proceedings have been
commenced within the European jurisdictional zone. Anti-suit relief remains
available if the foreign proceedings are outside the European Union.
B. ARBITRARION CLAUSES WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION OR FOR LUGANO
CONVENTION JURISDICTIONS
The European Court of Justice’s decision in Allianz SpA v. West Tankers37
prevents the Common Law anti-suit injunction from being issued to counter
breach of arbitration clauses by the commencement of inconsistent court
litigation within the same European jurisdictional zone. But Recital 12 of the
Jurisdiction Regulation (2012) (effective from 10 January 2015) makes clear that
a judgment by a Member State court on the substance of a civil or commercial

33. Id. at [66]–[117].
34. Id. at [38] (citing MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE INTRODUCTION OF FEES IN THE EMPLOYMENT
TRIBUNALS (2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/587649/Review-of-introduction-of-fees-in-employment-tribunals.pdf).
35. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 543 (appeal taken from U.K.).
36. 2005 E.C.R. I-03565; see also Neil Andrews, Abuse of Process and Obstructive Tactics Under the
Brussels Jurisdictional System: Unresolved Problems for the European Authorities in Erich Gasser GmbH v
MISAT Srl Cased C-116/02 (9 December 2003) and Turner v Grovit Case C-159/02 (27 April 2004), EUR.
COMMUNITY PRIV. L. REV. 8, 8–15 (2005); Commerzbank AG v. Liquimar Tankers Management Inc [2017]
EWHC (Comm) 161, [62]-[81] (Cranston, J.) (discussing “asymmetrical” jurisdiction clauses, one party being
subject to exclusivity, the other having a choice of jurisdictions).
37. 1 Lloyd’s Rep 413 (2009).
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case is binding, even though that decision involved an incidental decision that
the dispute was not subject to a valid arbitration clause.
In the Gazprom OAO v. Lietuvos Respublika case,38 the European Court of
Justice, confirming the West Tankers case, noted that it is incompatible with the
Jurisdiction Regulation for the court of a Member State to issue a decision
prohibiting the respondent from continuing, or initiating, civil or commercial
proceedings covered by the Jurisdiction Regulation39 in another Member State.
This is because the latter court must be permitted to determine for itself whether
it has jurisdiction40 and this includes determining whether there is a valid
arbitration clause in respect of the relevant civil or commercial matter.41
However, the European Court of Justice in the Gazprom OAO case
distinguished42 the grant by an arbitral tribunal of an anti-suit order from the
issue by a Member State court of an anti-suit injunction (as in the West Tankers
case). A Member State court does not act inconsistently with the Jurisdiction
Regulation if it decides to recognize or enforce such an arbitral award. The result
of such recognition might be that the relevant Member State court decides not
to receive or continue to hear a civil or commercial matter (wholly or partially).
Such a decision is compatible with the Jurisdiction Regulation for these reasons:
(1) issues of arbitration fall outside the scope of the Jurisdiction Regulation,43 so
that any decision on such a matter made by one Member State court cannot be
binding under the same Regulation on the courts of other Member States; (2) an
“anti-suit” arbitral award (that is, one which prohibits a party from pursuing or
continuing court proceedings) is unobjectionable under the Jurisdiction
Regulation because the arbitral tribunal is not a Member State court; and so the
arbitral award involves no attempt by a Member State court to preclude or
constrain (whether directly or indirectly) another Member State court’s
determination concerning its jurisdiction; there is no conflict between courts in
the matter of jurisdiction;44 and (3) the arbitral tribunal, unlike the Member State
court in the West Tankers context, has no direct power to issue penalties against
the party who fails to comply with the anti-suit prohibition.45 The result is that a
party who is subject to an arbitral tribunal’s prohibition has an opportunity to
38. Case
C-536/13,
ECJ
(May
13,
2015)
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=164260&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=77
98460.
39. The Gazprom case was decided under the pre-2012 Jurisdiction Regulation, Council Regulation (EC)
No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, but it is clear from the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet (delivered
Dec. 4, 2014) that Recital 12 in the preamble to the Brussels 1 Regulation (recast) (2012) is a “retroactive
interpretative law,” which “explains how [the arbitration] exclusion must be and always should have been
interpreted.” See Gazprom OAO v. Lietuvos Respublika, at [91] (2014) (opinion of Advocate General Wathelet).
40. Gazprom OAO (2015), at [32]–[33].
41. Id. at [34].
42. Id. at [35].
43. Id. at [28], [36].
44. Id. at [37].
45. Id. at [40].
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contest46 whether the prohibitive arbitral award (the “anti-suit” arbitral award)
should be recognized and enforced (in the case of a foreign arbitral award) by
applying the New York Convention 1958’s criteria.47
The European Court of Justice in the Gazprom case48 did not endorse
Advocate General Wathelet’s Opinion49 that West Tankers has been impliedly
reversed by Recital 12 of the Brussels 1 Regulation (recast).50 And so, the
Gazprom case confirms that courts in Member States still lack capacity to issue
anti-suit injunctions to give effect to arbitration clauses.
CONCLUSION
The main contention has been that the wide array of fundamental and
important principles of civil justice can be usefully arranged under these four
headings:
I. Access to Justice
II. Fairness of the Process
III. Speed and Efficiency
IV. Just Conclusions
The greatest impact of European law on English and indeed British law has
been Human Rights reasoning. But, this ‘impact’ was conveniently crafted by
jurists whose main aim was to recast the highest judicial chamber as a court quite
independent of Parliament. In short, the creation, under the Constitutional
Reform Act 2005, of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was ostensibly
compelled by European human rights jurisprudence. According to this analysis,
the court was necessary to achieve a hermetic separation of functions between
the legislature and judicial system and, in particular, to ensure that the Lord
Chancellor (that is, the Minister of Justice) can no longer sit as a judge. This
dismantling of long-standing arrangements was a dramatic, surprising, and
controversial “spin-off” from the separation of powers notion, more exactly, the
concept of “judicial independence,” contained within the European Convention
on Human Rights.

46. Id. at [38].
47. Id. at [38], [41]–[43].
48. Id.
49. Gazprom OAO v. Lietuvos Respublika, at [130]–[152] (2014) (opinion of Advocate General Wathelet).
50. Council Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351/1) 1, 32 (EU) (discussing jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters).
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